Justice O’Connor believes that Canadian misconduct may well have influenced the American decision to deport Arar and the Syrian decision to prolong his detention. The report blames Canadian officials for giving the Americans unfair and misleading material about Arar and for failing to do what was needed to secure his early release from Syria. And, if all this were not enough, certain Canadian officials reportedly continued to mistreat Arar even after he returned to this country. Some of them leaked material to the Canadian media that unfairly portrayed Arar as a terrorist suspect.

The question now is how to prevent a recurrence of such travesties. It will help to look for possible causes. After the atrocities of 9/11, a consensus quickly developed in Canada and other Western democracies that the priority was to prevent any further acts of terrorism. …

As wise as this approach appeared to be, it also had a downside. … When the goal is to anticipate what may happen in the future, there will be a tendency to learn as much as possible about an ever widening circle of possible suspects. Hence, more spying on more people. … In the past, this preventive focus [also] produced a host of surreptitious “dirty tricks” by the RCMP.

Another problem with the focus on prevention concerns the weaknesses of the traditional safeguards. … Those with grievances against the RCMP are often too intimidated to file complaints. Moreover, since many of the preventive tactics will likely be surreptitious, a good number of targets will simply not know that they are being victimized. This will render them unable to file complaints.

What about the supervisory role of the government? In the Canadian system, the government is not supposed to direct – or even know about – most police operations. The fear is that such ministerial involvement could wind up politicizing the police.

But, without such involvement, how can the government be adequately accountable for the police? ... When former foreign affairs minister Bill Graham was questioned at the inquiry, he acknowledged his inability to deal on “a level playing field” with his U.S. counterpart. The problem is that he was prevented from knowing sufficient operational details about the Arar case to enable him to negotiate with the American authorities. Thus, this doctrine of “ministerial ignorance” fuelled Canada’s inability to provide Arar with adequate protection.

Change is required. The government should acquire not only the relevant knowledge but also the power to direct all of Canada’s national security operations, including those of the RCMP.

One way to reduce the risks of politicizing the police is to create a system for independently auditing their policies and practices, including their pivotal relationship with the government. … The publicity from an audit report would help to pressure the government into correcting and redressing whatever improprieties are identified. Moreover, the mere knowledge that they are being audited could serve to improve the behaviour of the police and the government in the first place. These recommendations should apply not only to the RCMP but to all other government agencies involved in national security.

Such measures, of course, cannot guarantee that no innocent Canadian will again suffer the kind of ordeal that befell Maher Arar. But they could significantly lessen the prospects of a regrettable replay.

Excerpts from “Watching the Police: Ottawa must get more involved in monitoring the RCMP” published in the Winnipeg Free Press 22 September 2006 by A. Alan Borovoy, General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association