  
THE FREEDOM OF EACH AND THE EQUALITY OF ALL
If I try on a new pair of shoes, who knows better than I whether they pinch or they fit? Doctors, scientists, leather manufacturers, and sales clerks might know better whether the shoes are healthy, unhealthy, well-made, defective, durable, perishable, stylish, or gauche. But only I can know whether they feel comfortable. Who shall decide, then, the experts or I whether I am to buy the shoes? Which of us is to decide what weight to give to all the considerations which are involved in the decision to purchase or not to purchase? They who have the technical knowledge but who will not wear the shoes, or I who know only how the shoes feel and must wear them? In a rather over-simplified way, this question illustrates the basic difference between an autocratic and a democratic society. In an autocratic society, the tendency is for the rulers to decide how the citizens shall live. In a democratic society, the objective, as much as possible, is for the citizens to decide for themselves. Citizens in a democracy might seek and receive the advice of others. But, as much as possible, they must be free to accept or reject such advice, in whole or in part. Of course, this means that crucial decisions will be made by the foolish as well as the wise, the short-sighted as well as the far-sighted, the incompetent as well as the competent. Might not such freedom lead to wrong choices and perhaps even unhappiness for many people, especially the unwise? Perhaps, it might. Perhaps, it does. Unhappy consequences are an unavoidable risk of human life. But democrats believe that, as much as possible, the one who must suffer the consequences is the one who should have the right to decide. Indeed, the exercise of liberty is essential to the enhancement of dignity. While it is possible that the serf and the slave could receive adequate amounts of food clothing, and shelter, it is unlikely that they would ever acquire an adequate amount of respect for their own unique human personalities. One's sense of self-worth and dignity requires some control of one's destiny. Moreover, there is no guarantee that rulers will necessarily be more knowledgeable than many of their subjects and, even if they are, there is no guarantee that they will necessarily make the right decisions for their subjects. Even the most knowledgeable of rulers are human beings with human weaknesses. Despite what may be a greater knowledge of many problems faced by their subjects, the rulers, nevertheless, could be motivated by petty self-interest, prejudice, and even malice. There is another reason for democracy's commitment to the freedom of the individual - the belief that social progress is more likely to occur in an atmosphere where differences are permitted than in an atmosphere where differences are restricted. Many of the greatest human achievements were conceived in the womb of disagreement. If, for example, the Wright brothers had not disagreed with public opinion about the possibilities of air travel, they might never have pioneered the aeroplane.
Einstein, Edison, and many of the world's greatest poets, philosophers, artists, and writers were also propelled by disagreement with the prevailing beliefs and practices of their day. Even for strictly practical reasons, therefore, the democrat will tolerate, indeed will encourage, differences of opinion and lifestyle. Generally speaking, the democrat would prefer to run the risk of useless eccentricity, even some disruptive conflict, rather than stifle individual and social disagreement. Thus, democratic societies believe that each person should have the maximum in personal autonomy. It is the individual who should decide whether and whom to marry, whether and how to worship, whether and what to read, write, watch, hear, see, or say. You should be free to determine your own life in your own way - work at what fulfils you, play at what pleases you, and pursue what intrigues you.
My freedom to drive in this manner immediately clashes with the freedoms of others who wish to enjoy the bounties of Yonge Street - shoppers, pedestrians, other motorists. If I pursue my freedom in the above manner, their freedom will be severely restricted. Obviously, our freedoms cannot co-exist. One must give way to the other. With a little imagination, we can conceive of infinite examples of the same problem. Does the freedom of the individual include the freedom to kill, maim, rape, and assault? The perpetrator and the victim cannot both have absolute freedom of choice. Thus, we must face the fundamental paradox. The existence of freedom demands the imposition of restrictions. In order to accomplish this task, we have developed a system of laws. In order to make the laws work, we have harnessed our combined powers into the complex and coercive machinery of the modern state. We have a parliament to pass laws, a government to administer laws, and a police department to enforce laws. Ironically, these potent instruments for the restriction of liberty are necessary for the enjoyment of liberty. Thus, the only meaningful question concerns the kind and the extent of restrictions or laws we shall have. To put it even more specifically, what restrictions are appropriate in a democracy where the object is to promote the greatest possible freedom of the individual? The renowned nineteenth century philosopher on liberty, John Stuart Mill, attempted to grapple with this problem. According to Mill, "... the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." In some of the foregoing examples, the restrictions we enact enjoy a virtually universal consensus. In order to prevent physical harm to others, we prohibit the individual from engaging in physical attacks upon other people. In order to prevent economic harm to others, we outlaw theft, robbery, forgery, etc. These kinds of examples form the basis of our criminal law. During the 20th century, however, we have gone much further. In order to prevent the harm caused to industrial workers by the conditions of modern industry, we imposed restrictions upon the conduct of individuals engaged in business activity. We required employers to install safety equipment, pay minimum wages, observe maximum hours, and bargain collectively with unions. Employers lost the freedom to determine unilaterally the conditions of work for their employees. In order to prevent the harm caused by racial discrimination, we imposed restrictions upon the selection of employees by employers and tenants by landlords. Employers and landlords lost their freedom to base their selections on considerations of race, creed, and colour. Indeed, the entire apparatus of the modern welfare state represents a series of intrusions upon the freedoms of some sectors of society in order to promote the welfare of other sectors of society. The propriety or impropriety of social welfare legislation is not our concern here. Suffice it to recognize that certain restrictions imposed upon some may enhance the liberty enjoyed by others. The question at any given time is which freedoms to be exercised by which persons in which situations are to be given more weight. Is the harm inflicted in the absence of restrictions greater than the harm inflicted through the adoption of restrictions?
This balancing process brings us to the relationship between freedom and equality. Since one person's freedom may be another's restriction,
Until recent times in some Western societies, certain classes of people suffered certain restrictions, essentially because, as people, they were considered less important than everyone else. Jews, for example, were barred from certain occupations. Blacks were held as slaves. Women, Aboriginals, and poor people were denied the right to vote. The interests of white, propertied Christian males were frankly considered to be paramount. Such notions are prepugnant to the democratic philosophy. Despite the fact that people differ in race, creed, colour, sex, wealth, talent, and ability, the democratic system deems them to be equal in dignity. No one is deemed to be more or less important than anyone else. Thus, while it is impossible to avoid restrictions that may benefit some and burden others, democratic societies believe in the principle of equal consideration. Even if people are sometimes subject to differential treatment, they must receive equal consideration. Indeed, most families operate on a similar basis. Parents might permit their older children greater privileges than their younger children. They might bestow greater protection upon their sick children than upon their healthy children. Notwithstanding the different ways that parents might treat their offspring, they, nevertheless, can love them equally. It is similar with the relationship between a democratic society and its citizens. Rich people may be taxed more heavily than poor people. Wheat growers may be subject to greater state regulations than bracelet distributors. Notwithstanding the different ways that a democratic society may treat these people, it, nevertheless, must regard them equally. The higher taxes imposed upon the rich are justified not on the basis that the rich, as people, are less important than the poor, but rather on the basis that they are better able to bear such financial burdens. The greater state regulation imposed upon wheat growers is justified not on the basis that wheat growers, as people, are less important than bracelet distributors, but rather on the basis that, in certain societies, wheat has more economic and social signifigance than bracelets. It is not the function of this pamphlet to debate the pros and cons of progressive taxation or wheat regulation. Our function, rather, is to set out the standards for appropriate restrictions on the freedom of the individual. The restrictions which a democracy imposes upon its citizens must reflect an equal concern for everyone affected. On the moral and social scales, we all weigh the same.
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The Fundamentals Of Our Fundamental Freedoms -- The Booklet Contents |
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But the freedom of the individual has its limitations. Suppose, for example, that my greatest joy comes from the thrill I feel in racing my automobile? Should my individual freedom, then, include the right to drive my car down Toronto's busy Yonge Street at 75 kilometres an hour on a Friday afternoon?
society cannot help assessing the relative importance of the interests in conflict.